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ABSTRACT 
IPv6 provides more address space, improved address design, and greater security than IPv4. Different transition 
mechanisms can be used to migrate from IPv4 to IPv6 which includes dual stack networks, tunnels and translation 
technologies. Within all of this, network security is an essential element and therefore requires special attention. This 
paper analyses two transition technologies which are dual stack and tunnel. Both technologies are implemented using 
Cisco Packet Tracer and GNS3. This work will also analyse the security issues of IPv6 to outline the most common 
vulnerabilities and security issues during the transition. Finally, we will design and implement the dual stack, automatic 
and manual tunnelling transition mechanisms using Riverbed Modeler simulation tool to analyse the performance and 
compare with the native IPv4 and IPv6 networks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The IPv4 address space is quickly being exhausted, and there is a great need for a new protocol to overcome 
the lack of address space. It is for this reason that the new IPv6 protocol has been introduced, giving a larger 
address pool as it uses 128-bit address sizes. This means that there are many more addresses available than 
there are Internet-connected devices which mean that IPv6 is future-proof and allows for significant growth in 
internet technology. A further advantage is that there is no requirement for Network Address Translator (NAT) 
because each device is assigned a unique IP address. IPv6 has been designed with new features such as auto-
configuration of addresses, improved the security, better quality of service (QoS) and a new header format [1]. 
It is due to this scarcity of address space that organisations are beginning the migration to IPv6 within their 
networks.  
IPv6 and IPv4 are incompatible protocols, which means that interconnection between protocols is not available 
to network users, prohibiting them from connecting across networks. Therefore there is a requirement to use a 
transition mechanism(s) to allow for smooth migration and to allow IPv6 hosts to pass through IPv4 networks 
or connect with IPv4 hosts. The designers of IPv6 in the original specification (RFC 1752) defined the 
following transition criteria: 
 It is simple to upgrade IPv4 hosts to IPv6 without disruption and can these be done without an upgrade 
of other routers or hosts which may be on the network? 
 There are no dependencies which exist on other hosts or routing infrastructure when adding new IPv6 
hosts. 
 Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses can be used in tandem without the need to upgrade all nodes at the 
same time. 
 Upgrading IPv4 infrastructure to IPv6 requires little preparation, much like with deploying new IPv6 
nodes.  
There are a number of transition technologies which have been proposed and are widely use today such as dual 
stack and tunnel mechanisms. Due to the Internet services which widely use IPv4, it is important to know that 
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the transition from the previous protocol to IPv6 may take years to complete, and that means both protocols 
will be working together [2].  
It can be said that changes in networks such as an upgrade to IPv6 may cause issues and may come at a high 
risk to an organisation. Network security is a very important aspect that should be looked at before migrating 
to IPv6. Moreover, most network security tools are designed and implemented to secure the IPv4 only. The 
scarcity of IPv6 related tools for network security analysis, as well as the lack of trained professionals, will 
lead to slow response times against network attacks.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the dual stack and tunnelling technologies while also looking at security 
risks of IPv6 and transition technologies. This will be accomplished by looking at both dual stack and 
tunnelling mechanisms in section 3, the translation security issues in section 4, the implementation and analysis 
of dual stack and tunnelling mechanisms along with IPv6 attacks in section 5, the performance analysis of 
various network scenarios in section 6 and final thoughts and conclusion in section 7. 
2. BACKGROUND 
This section examines the research which has already been conducted in IPv6 and looks at where further 
research is required. Despite the immature nature of IPv6, it has become a widely researched topic; however, 
one may say that there are still gaps in knowledge which have been generated by this research. In trying to 
accomplish the objectives of the research, the first element requires the IPv6 transition mechanisms to be 
defined, [3] an explanation for the scarcity of address spaces in IPv4 and extensive growth of the Internet in 
the past couple of years. Many kinds of systems and servers over the Internet have been developed based on 
IPv6 such as online shopping, Internet banking and trading stocks [4][5].  
One can clearly identify the need for IPv6 addresses; however, the question remains as to what is going to 
happen to the existing IPv4 addressing schema? IPv4 and IPv6 are not able to work together in ways which 
would make them stable in a network environment and where they are able to interact easily with each other. 
The result is going to be the new IPv6 protocol being implemented alone, or both protocols will work together. 
Authors in [2] states that it is indispensable to maintain the IPv4 availability, to provide the inter-
communication ability of IPv4 and IPv6. Most of the existing network applications are written for IPv4, but it 
is not very difficult to convert most IPv4 applications into applications compatible with IPv4 and IPv6 [6]. 
After realising the need of transition, the next section is to look for transition mechanisms. IPv4 to IPv6 
migration can be divided two ways; aggressive and passive migration [7]. In the aggressive migration, IPv4 is 
directly disposed of and the whole infrastructure is replaced with IPv6. In passive migration, IPv6 is not ready 
so transition needs to be used and infrastructure of IPv4 is not discarded. Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) has proposed many transition mechanisms to enable the networks to migrate to IPv6. There are several 
proposed mechanisms, with the best being tunnelling, dual stack and translation [1] [3] [5] [8] [9]. Dual stack 
mechanisms enable only similar network nodes to communicate with each other. Dual stack is the most 
extensively employed mechanism today.  
In tunnelling mechanisms, IPv6 data is encapsulated within IPv4 packets and routed through IPv4 network(s). 
The source and the end points of the tunnel have to be dual stack [10]. Authors in [3] explains about the design 
and implementation of smooth transition mechanism based on tunnelling and translation technology and what 
characteristic features transition mechanism should possess. Peng Wu and Chris Metz explain about the 
tunnelling based route optimisations stating what should be done in optimising the tunnel transition 
mechanisms.  
Once transition mechanisms have been examined, the following section will research the security aspects with 
regards to the transition mechanisms which are in place to avoid the threat of attacks to secure the end-to-end 
connection. During the IPv4 to IPv6 transition, both IPv4 networks and IPv6 networks will coexist. In this 
situation, the security risk and attacks are expected to increase. Caicedo and Joshi studied the security issues 
of IPv6 and outline the challenges in deploying and migrating to IPv6. They have divided IPv6 attack to four 
types which are reconnaissance, host initialization and associated, multicast-based, and attacks using routing 
header attacks [11]. IPv6 provides an integrated security through IPSec protocol which is mandatory for IPv6 
networks. IPSec defines two types of security through authentication header and encapsulated security payload 
[12].  IPSec in tunnel makes source address validation for the IPv4 packet but does not verify the contents of 
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the payload where the IPv6 address is carried. Authors in [13] proposed a new mechanism to avoid and remove 
the spoofing attack in IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel using IPSec in transport mode. Many firewalls need to be 
coordinated and consistent to be properly managed, because the firewalls have separate rule sets for IPv4 and 
IPv6 which avoid inadvertent security exposure and intentional attack. The paper [14] outlines the 
effectiveness of conventional network security tools used to detect anomalies occurring on transition 
mechanisms. It further goes on to prove, using simulations, what can be the threat in IPv6 transition using the 
standard firewall and protection against the network attack. They found that automatic tunnel mechanisms are 
less secure than configured tunnels.  However, Ting Liu and Yu Qu discussed a serious vulnerability in terms 
of worm propagation in IPv6 and dual-stack networks.  
Before the transition mechanism(s) can be applied to large-scale deployment, systematic and quantitative 
performance analysis should be carried out [2]. Based on IPv6 transition technologies, Wu and Zhou [8] used 
three kinds of transition mechanism to analyse and test the performance; the three mechanisms are dual-stack, 
ISATAP tunnel and 6to4 tunnel. The result shows that within a dual stack environment, IPv6 has better 
performance than IPv4, ISATAP and 6to4 mechanisms [8]. Also, Shaneel and Sotharith [10] have evaluated 
the performance of configured tunnel and 6to4 tunnel. Both mechanisms are implemented on two Windows 
Servers; they measured performance metrics such as delay, throughput, CPU usage and jitter. The results 
obtained on the test-bed show that jitter values and TCP/UDP throughput of the two mechanisms are similar, 
but delay and CPU reading are significantly different depending on the choice of transition mechanism and 
operating system [10]. Moreover, Junaid and Javed [15] made an empirical evaluation of three commonly used 
transition technologies which are dual stack, manual IPv6 in IPv4 tunnel and automatic 6to4 tunnel. Finally, 
they made comparison of performance metrics with the native IPv6 environment. The results have shown that 
IPv6 network suffers a minimum delay and produces a higher throughput. 
3. TRANSITION TECHNOLOGY  
To provide an eventual transition to IPv6 only infrastructure and to currently coexist with IPv4 infrastructure, 
various transition mechanisms are proposed by IETF. Tunnel and dual stack are the most common technologies 
used while IPv6 translation [14],[16]. 
3.1. IPv4/IPv6 Dual-Stack 
Dual-stack technology means IPv4 and IPv6 protocol stacks exist simultaneously on terminal devices and 
network nodes. Dual-stack architecture can receive, process, and forward data for both IPv4 and IPv6 nodes 
separately without making any change to the packet header. Also, it is one of the simplest transition 
technologies used today [5]. Figure 1 shows the operation of dual-stack technology. 
 
 
Figure 1.   (a) Single Stack                   (b) A Dual Stack Architecture [15] 
The interface of the device configured as dual-stack can have IPv6-only or IPv4-only or both addresses. The 
router contains two routing tables, one for IPv4 addresses and one for IPv6 addresses. When a dual-stack node 
receives a data segment, the node checks the packet header at the link layer. If the packet header is IPv4, the 
packet is handled by the IPv4 protocol stack. If the packet header is IPv6, the packet is handled by the IPv6 
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protocol stack. As to end hosts, modern computer operating systems have implemented dual-stack protocol 
[2].  
3.2. Tunnelling Technology 
Tunnels provide a method to carry IPv6 traffic to other IPv6 networks over an IPv4 network infrastructure. 
There are two types of tunnel which are configured and automatic tunnels, however, the IPv6 packets are 
encapsulated within IPv4 packets as shown in figure 2, and then IPv6 data can be transmitted through IPv4 
networks [2]. The source and the destination points of the tunnel have to be IPv4/IPv6 dual stacked nodes [5].  
 
Figure 2. Format of IPv6 packet in Tunnel 
The following tunnelling configurations are defined by RFC 2893 – this allows for the tunnelling of IPv6 
traffic between the nodes across an IPv4 only infrastructure [17]: 
 Router-to-Router 
Within the dual stack environment, the router-to-router tunnel will be created which connects IPv6 nodes by 
way of IPv4 infrastructure. With the use of the logical link between the source and destination routers, 
communications are possible as in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Router-to-Router Tunnel 
 Host-to-Router or Router-to-Host 
The IPv6 node which is placed within an IPv4 infrastructure will create the IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel to reach the 
IPv6/IPv4 router. The tunnel begins at the host and finishes at the router or vice versa as in figure 4.  
 





The IPv6/IPv4 node which is residing within the IPv4 infrastructure will create the IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel. The 
tunnel spans from the source to the destination nodes as in figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Host-to-Host Tunnel 
3.2.1. Configured Tunnels 
Within the tunnelling environments, the IPv6 packets which are sent from the originating node are 
encapsulated within an IPv4 tunnel. At the end point, the packets are decapsulated into IPv6 traffic. The 
configuration information which is stored at the endpoint of the tunnel will determine the addresses. 
Configured tunnels can be placed within a router-to-router, host-to-router/router-to-host or host-to-host 
environments.  
3.2.2. Automatic Tunnels 
The difference between automatic and manual tunnels lies in that there is no need to pre-configure tunnels and 
nodes; all nodes automatically set up the tunnelling procedure [18]. There are many types of automatic tunnels:
  
3.2.2.1.  6to4  
The 6to4 method allows for connection to exist between two IPv6 domains where an IPv4 network resides 
between them. The IPv4 addresses are part of the IPv6 addressing schema while the packets are being 
transferred as IPv4 is the link. The 6to4 procedure has a unique prefix: 2002: IPv4 address::/48. This procedure 
works within the router-to-router configuration.  
3.2.2.2.  6over4 
Where a network consists of IPv6 capable hosts and routers but the network operates within IPv4, 6over4 will 
treat the IPv4 network as a virtual Ethernet for IPv6 communications. IPv4 multicast is used to tunnel the IPv6 
packets.  
3.2.2.3.  ISATAP  
ISATAP (Intra-Side Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol) uses an address assignment for automatic 
tunnelling which is used within the unicast IPv6 connectivity. This is most used where IPv6 and IPv4 hosts 
exist within an IPv4 intranet. ISATAP is not able to support multicasts as it uses Non-Broadcast Multi-Access 
(NBMA) communication model. ISATAP addresses use the locally administered interface identifier 
::5EFE:private unicast IPv4 address, or ::200:5EFE:public unicast IPv4 address. 
3.2.2.4.  Tunnel Broker   
The tunnel broker acts as a tunnel creation mechanism between two nodes within network environments. This 
is a simple form of automatic tunnelling which only requires there to be a web server and client-side 
authentication to gather details such as IP address, operating system and IPv6 compatibility. Figure 6 shows 




Figure 6. Tunnel Broker mechanism [24] 
3.2.2.5.  Teredo  
Teredo assists in providing an IPv6 over UDP connection where the IPv6 host is behind a NAT router without 
a unique public IPv4 address. Teredo is a mechanism which aids interfacing IPv6 nodes by use of the internet. 
IPv6 nodes may be connected to IPv4 internet through NAT devices.  
4. SECURITY ISSUES  
Before any migration or dual stack environment can be installed with IPv6, all the security aspects and 
implications which exist must be looked into to avoid network disruption. Due to the new nature of the IPv6 
technology, these risks are higher than ever [14]. The securities issues need to be looked into consist of IPv6 
protocol issues, transition mechanisms and the IPv6 deployment issues.  
4.1. IPv6 Protocols Issues  
Because there are many differences in features between IPv4 and IPv6, there are many new security issues 
which must be looked into. Some of the features which cause significant security issues have been further 
discussed below.  
4.1.1. Extension Headers 
Extension headers, simply, are a header placed on packets which are sent through the IPv6 network. These 
headers can be chained together to allow one header to point to another. Needless to say, all IPv6 nodes must 
be capable of accepting packets and reading the relevant headers. Currently, there are six extension headers 
which have been defined. It has been defined that “IPv6 nodes must accept and attempt to process extension 
headers in any order and occurring any number of times in the same packet” [19]. 
There are some security flaws with extension headers which may allow users to avoid access based control 
systems and also due to the nature of the headers it is also possible for an intruder to send a packet to a public 
address containing a forbidden address. Spoofing packets in these ways may lead to a denial-of-service (DOS) 
attack and therefore causes issues for all nodes on the network (Martin and Dunn).  
The first method by which extension headers can be used maliciously is where an attacker uses a long chain 
of headers such that security devices are no longer be able to get to the transport layer for the deep packet 
inspection to be carried out [20].  
The issue with this technique and many like it is that they are compatible with the IPv6 specification and 
therefore routers are not able to stop them. It is of the utmost importance that security policies are implemented 
to mitigate these risks.  
Within IPv4, deep packet inspection ensures that all packets which contain damaging and unknown options, 
therefore extending this service to IPv6 will ensure the same security. However, this is inconsistent with 
RFC2406 (IPv6 Specification) which makes it a requirement for hop-by-hop options only. The specification 
also does not allow for headers to be processed in any other way than has been shown in the packet itself. The 
specification, therefore, does not take account of middleboxes and their behaviour which puts a limit on packet 
inspection policies.  
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4.1.1.1.  Hop-by-Hop Extension Headers 
Another important element which must be examined with regards to extension headers is the hop-by-hop 
extension header which is used to carry information which must be looked at by every node within the delivery 
path of the packet. The option header is defined by the Next Header value of 0 in the IPv6 header. 
The benefit of hop-by-hop option headers is that they can have any number of hop-by-hop options with certain 
options appearing multiple times within the chain. Attackers can use inconsistent option values or invalid 
options which can lead to ‘Parameter Problem’ ICMPv6 error messages. In certain circumstances, the attacker 
may be able to burden the router to the point that a DOS attack is created [19][20]   
4.1.2. Fragmentation 
IPv6 by default does not prohibit the reassembly of overlapping fragments even though this is a well-known 
security threat which can be used to avoid firewalls. In IPv4, mitigation measures were in place allowing the 
dropping of fragments with an offset of one byte. However, this option is not available with IPv6 due to the 
header containing any number of extension headers.  
Due to this, overlapping fragments are now not allowed to be sent within an IPv6 environment because non-
threatening nodes no longer have the need to send overlaps. However, fragmentation is still possible only from 
the source node which makes the path MTU discovery method an obligation. The minimum requirement which 
has been suggested for MTU size is 1280 octets and therefore anything below this should be dropped unless 
the packet is the last to come through [20].  
Intruders into the network may not be able to find port numbers in the first fragment and thus can bypass 
security monitoring devices expecting to be within the transport layer. Alternatively, an intruder may be able 
to send a large number of smaller packets causing an overload on the resources and creating a DoS attack. 
These risks can be mitigated by implementing a limitation on the total number of fragments and allowing space 
between their arrival times [20].  
4.1.3. Auto-configuration 
Auto-configuration is a method of automatically generating the address for a node which is placed on an IPv6 
network. With the introduction of more devices into a network, auto-configuration allows the network to run 
without the DHCP server. IPv6 nodes can configure themselves through either stateless or stateful 
configuration. The stateless auto configuration will generate an address based on the network prefix which is 
obtained from the router and the MAC address of the node. Stateful autoconfiguration, on the other hand, uses 
a DHCPv6 server to gain an address.  
Stateless auto-configuration is one of the key features of IPv6. However, it does have a lot of network 
vulnerabilities and security concerns attached to it as in figure 7. One of the major concerns is the trust model 
which is the network and node trust within the environment. The issue with the SLAAC (Stateless Address 
Autoconfiguration) system is that any node can acquire an address without approval or control and this, 
therefore, opens the network to external threats. A node is also able to acquire the global prefix and router 
advertisement using ICMPv6 messages for Neighbour Discovery (ND). This can, therefore, build a globally 
routable address which can be set up without approval [11][14][19]. The following types of attacks are 
therefore made possible due to this security flaw: 
A. Malicious Router: a device on the network may work as a man-in-the-middle and act as the router 
link advertising itself and allowing connections. It can then gather the information which is being 
passed over the network.  
B. Attack on a legitimate router: a malicious device on the network can take the legitimate router out 
of action and act itself as a router. Alternatively, the malicious device can attack the router to change 
its configuration.  
C. Bad prefixes: a malicious device can advertise itself as a router and then advertise bad prefixes which 
are not on the link. All hosts which use auto configuration will then have an invalid address.  
D. Failure of DAD and NUD Processes: a malicious node is able to reply to DAD with an NA packet 
and prevent new nodes from joining. The NA packet sends information claiming that it is already using 
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the address which has been requested. In the same way, it is possible for the malicious device to falsely 
respond to NUD messages causing an NUD process failure.  
E. Non-existent address: an external host may be able to send traffic to a legitimate looking address 
however it will carry an invalid interface ID. The machine will try to resolve the issue and therefore 
spend resources doing so, making it vulnerable to a DOS attack.  
 
Figure 7.  Attacks on IPv6 autoconfiguration process [11] 
4.1.4. Multiple Addresses 
IPv6 allows the assignment of multiple addresses to an interface, however, due to address based filtering no 
longer being an option due to the auto configuration, a firewall has to be able to learn the addresses dynamically 
and therefore all filtering rules need to be generated automatically using a high-level policy rule-set. 
Unfortunately, this is not an option which is available and therefore leaves networks vulnerable. Identification 
tokens are another option to identify hosts. However, ISO layer 3 does not have this capability [25].  
4.1.5. Multicast-Based Networks 
IPv6 a multicast network eliminates broadcasting of addresses and instead employs the multicast heavily. An 
attack on a multicast network can obstruct the ability of a node to operate. A DOS attack is very easily done 
by sending messages to the group addresses informing all members that they must leave. IPv6 also adopts 
standard multicast addresses for important devices such as routers and DHCP servers; any attack which is 
placed on these devices can be done by modifying messages directed to these addresses and thereby assists in 
receiving information from the systems.  
4.2. Transition Technologies Issues  
It is important to build an in-depth understanding of security issues of transition mechanisms as this may assist 
network administrators in applying the appropriate security mechanisms within the network. This section is 
concerned with dual stack and tunnelling mechanisms.  
4.2.1. Dual-Stack 
When a dual-stack environment is set up, it must be ensured that the devices which are on the network have 
adequate security to mitigate the risk of attacks in both IPv4 and IPv6 environments. Hosts will therefore 
control firewalls, VPN clients and IDS/IPS systems and these must be able to inspect traffic from IPv4 and 
IPv6 and block any unauthorised traffic independently of each other. The network administrators within an 
environment should consider implementing IPv6 only firewalls which can secure the network the same way it 
would be secured in the IPv4 network [14].  
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4.2.1.1. Dual Stack Worm 
There has been a recent discovery of the IPv4-IPv6 dual-stack-worm which can detect victims who are within 
the same IPv6 subnet using multicast scanning. At the same time it can scan targets within a different IPv6 
subnet or scan within IPv4 only networks using random scanning. The worm will find any hosts on the network 
which are vulnerable and infect them by exploiting vulnerabilities in the systems. Figure 8 shows the attack 
strategy and propagation strategy within a dual stack environment of the IPv4-IPv6 dual-stack-worm [22].   
 
Figure 8. IPv4-IPv6 dual-stack worm: (a) Attack strategy (b) Propagation in the hybrid network [22] 
4.2.1.2. Quality of Data Transmission 
An important aspect which must be considered when looking at IPv6 deployment with respect to both tunnel 
and dual stack transition mechanisms is the quality of data transmission. The most common method in which 
this can be checked is to use the ping and traceroute towards IPv4 and IPv6 dual-stack sites to know the round 
trip time (RTT). A common issue which is seen here is that when tunnels are set up for experimentation or 
when tunnels have been badly configured, it leads to a loss of quality within the data transmission seen by a 
longer RTT. This is due to the number of tunnel connections which are implemented in certain scenarios. 
4.2.1.3. Handling Multiple Responses 
The issue of how configurations information should be handled is another concern. These may be gathered 
from multiple sources and can exist where there are both DHCP and DHCPv6 servers, that is, two physical 
nodes or two servers running on the same node. A method by which the lists can be merged to show a list of 
addresses may also be required. Of course, nodes may opt to only use one of the servers and only where no 
answer is received will they follow up with another.  
Merging can certainly be accomplished. However, it may pose some complexity. There may reside issues of 
priority or the storing and usage of the nodes. 
4.2.1.4. Different Administrative Management 
There are cases in which IPv6 services may be administered and managed by different organisations or people. 
This is most likely going to be the case where a wireless environment exists. This does, however, pose a 
problem for consistency of data which is offered by each DHCP version. The protocols by which each client 
connects may be different, and therefore clients may gain an advantage from this administrative domain. 
4.2.1.5. DNS Load Balancing 
Administrators may often choose to opt for DNS server information lists for load balancing. However, each 
node will give different responses to different clients. Responses which are from different DHCP versions may 




4.2.2. Tunnelling  
Due to the many tunnels which can be employed within a network environment, there are many security issues 
which present themselves. Namely, with automatic tunnel procedures because there is no destination set in 
place therefore more vulnerabilities which may present themselves. [23] Both configured and automatic 
tunnels with their issues are discussed below.  
4.2.2.1.  Configured Tunnels 
Firstly, it must be said that configured tunnels are more secure than automatic tunnels because each tunnel 
which is configured will be set up with both source and destination. The issue however lies in the open port 
between the IPv4 and IPv6 networks; the concern lies in the firewalls and the data which is passed between 
them. Currently, there is no way of authenticating any users or information which is passed through the two 
networks, therefore leaving either or both network(s) in a vulnerable position. The only way in which it is 
possible to authenticate is to look at the source IP address. However, packets are then subject to exploits such 
as IP spoofing and injection packets at the endpoints of the tunnel.  
4.2.2.2.  Automatic Tunnels 
As has been previously mentioned, automatic tunnels are not as secure as manually configured tunnels. 
Automatic tunnels are easily affected by packet forgery and DOS attacks because there is no preconfigured 
endpoint. The network architecture must therefore provide mechanisms which can protect against IPv4 and 
IPv6 vulnerabilities. The security of tunnelling mechanisms is discussed below [18]:  
4.2.2.2.1. 6to4 
As defined in (RFC 3964), 6to4 is susceptible to the following attacks: ND messages, spoofing; reflecting, 
IPv4 broadcast attack.  
4.2.2.2.1.1.  Attacks with ND Messages 
The 6to4 router works in a way that it will assume that all the routers and relays are “on-link” and therefore it 
is possible to attach with ND messages from the IPv4 network (this is on the assumption that there has been 
no prior trust relationship established). The attack will target the 6to4 pseudo-interface, using link-local 
addresses, and as long as the 6to4 addresses have not been used in the source or destination there are no security 
checks on these packets.  
4.2.2.2.1.2.  Spoofing Traffic  
Both IPv4 and IPv6 nodes can be a victim of this attack, which would involve the packets being modified in 
some way by the node and then sent to the target addresses. This attack can then lead to a DOS attack. Although 
DOS attacks in this way is not a new thing, what makes DOS attacks in this scenario obscure is that the source 
of the spoofing is much more difficult to locate as the 6to4 router does not log the IPv4 addresses, therefore 
hiding the address of the attacker.  
4.2.2.2.1.3.  Reflecting Traffic to 6to4 Nodes 
Reflecting traffic is very similar to spoofing traffic; however, in this case the spoofed packet is sent to an IPv6 
node either originating at an IPv4 node through a 6to4 relay or an IPv6 native node.  
4.2.2.2.1.4.  Local IPv4 Broadcast Attack  
This attack only applies to 6to4 routers where they do not check whether the IPv4 address of the router which 
is receiving the encapsulated IPv6 packet is a local broadcast address or a multicast address. This attack occurs 
where a 6to4 node attempts to send a packet to an address which corresponds to the broadcast address remotely. 
Another attack which can be initiated is where an IPv4 node not belonging to the local network sends traffic 
with an invalid source address. The 6to4 router would then respond by sending ICMPv6 packets to the source, 
thereby creating a DOS attack.  
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4.2.2.2.2. ISATAP  
Much like 6to4, ISATAP employs headers to send information from one protocol version to another and 
therefore it is susceptible the same types of risks which have been discussed in 6to4.  
4.2.2.2.3. Teredo  
Teredo relies on the endpoints of the tunnel to encapsulate and decapsulate packets, therefore any host which 
is within the LAN, which refers to any host behind the firewall, is able to encapsulate and decapsulate packets. 
It is difficult to secure all endpoints and therefore a single firewall would be required to secure the network. 
However, because the packets are encapsulated, it is impossible for the firewall to read the information within 
the packets. Therefore packet spoofing is still a concern.  
4.2.2.2.4. Tunnel Broker 
Much like the previous mechanisms, packet spoofing is a serious concern; however, in this scenario the 
firewalls and other security systems are sometimes placed quite far from the source and destination endpoints, 
therefore, response times are increased while availability and confidentiality are significantly decreased. A 
malicious user can easily exploit the network by requesting multiple tunnels and depleting the resources of the 
network, thereby creating a DOS attack.  
4.3. IPv6 Deployment Issues 
Most new devices are coming with IPv6 compatibility and do not come in an IPv6 only form. It is important 
that all IPv6 technologies are thoroughly tested and it is ensured that all data which is passing over is secure 
and free from spoofing or other such attacks which could cause harm to either the network or its users. The 
administrators must ensure that all transition mechanisms are considered when looking at security policies.  
There are issues such as DNS servers, addressing schemes and multiple address registrations which require 
proper observation with the current technologies; therefore time must be invested into working out a solution 
such that time can be saved with managing the network. Certain operating systems by default have IPv6 
functionality enabled. However, the technology behind the hardware is not capable of IPv6 traffic, therefore 
causing security issues.  
Due to all these issues, it is important that not only network administrators but also staff are trained on the 
procedures and security matters with regards to IPv6. A method in which one can ensure the security of a 
network is to use the software which has been proposed in the research by Lai [27]. This software can assist in 
looking through the IPv6 network and determining whether the security devices which have been implemented 
are secure. The software will launch a virtual machine, followed by a series of attacks which can be done using 
different tools. Finally, the software will generate a report and it will show the network administrators whether 
the network is secure or not; if it is proven to be insecure, it will provide suggestions as to how network 
administrators may solve the vulnerabilities.  
 
5.  IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION SCHEMES AND ATTACKS 
This section looks at the transition technologies implementation and looks at the possible attacks which can be 
done on IPv6.  
5.1. Dual-Stack implementation  
In this paper, dual stack network are designed and implemented using Cisco Packet Tracer software. This 
section intends to analyse the implementation strategy of the dual stack network, paying attention to Cisco 
Router implementation and the two methods of dual-stack that can be used.   
5.1.1. Router Dual Stack 
Within the network, two routers are connected through serial ports with two nodes on each router, one which 
is in IPv6 and the other in IPv4 address; this is the setup of a router dual stack network where the router can 
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forward data from both protocols. The network addresses and routing paths will be determined once it is clear 
which protocol the hosts are using. The IP forwarding function will then be configured on each router to allow 
for information to travel over the networks. Figure 2 below shows the results of the Cisco Packet Tracer: 
 
Figure 9. Router dual-stack network 
Figure 9 shows that both IPv6 nodes can communicate with each other and both IPv4 nodes also can 
communicate with each other. However, IPv6 node is unable to communicate with another IPv4 node.  
When a new host is connected to the switch S1, the host must be IPv4, despite the router being dual stack, 
because Fa0/0 is configured with an IPv4 address only. Likewise, if a new host is connected to S2, the host 
must be IPv6 because Fa0/1 is configured with an IPv6 address only.  
5.1.2. Router and Application Dual Stack  
Similar to the previous scenario, an IPv4 and an IPv6 user exists, however, as opposed to IPv4 and IPv6 
servers being implemented, only one dual stack server exists.  
As mentioned previously, where the fast Ethernet port is only configured with one address for one protocol, 
only hosts using that protocol can connect. Where in this scenario the fast Ethernet port is configured with 
both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and connected to a switch, any new host which joins the network is able to 
communicate with the server regardless of the protocol they are using. This has been shown in figure 10. 
 




From the experiment conducted as per the above, it can be concluded that, with regards to the router dual stack, 
only hosts which are working on the same protocol can communicate with each other. In the router and 
application dual stack, however, with the server running dual-stack as well as the routers, both IPv4 and IPv6 
hosts are able to communicate and access the server.  
5.2. Tunnel Implementation Method and Analysis 
As has been explained above, tunnels have many vulnerabilities which need to be investigated, in particular, 
the 6to4 tunnel which has vulnerabilities to sniffing, spoofing and DOS attacks. 
5.2.1. Method 
In the experiment, two dual-stack routers with one IPv4 router between them is used. The dual-stack routers 
are connected to two hosts on each network independently. This has been shown in figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Network topology 
A 6to4 tunnel is created between R1 and R3 for the two IPv6 networks to communicate through the existing 
IPv4 network. In doing this, the serial ports on all routers are assigned an IPv4 address, while the two IPv6 
networks are connected via fast Ethernet ports on routers R1 and R3 which are assigned IPv6 addresses.  
Data will be sent from the Windows 7 host to the Server 2008 host through the 6to4 tunnel and packets will 
be captured anywhere between the start and end points of the tunnel.  
5.2.2. Results 
Given the method used above, the Wireshark packet capturing software was used to analyse data which was 
sent between the IPv6 networks. The analysis of a packet within the tunnel shows that both IPv4 and IPv6 
protocols exist within the same ICMP message which proves that the IPv6 packet is encapsulated within the 
IPv4 tunnel as an IPv4 packet. This is shown in figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. ICMPv6 Frame 
Looking at this packet in detail in figure 13, the IPv4 segment of the header is analysed. The source and 
destination (as highlighted in figure below) have been clearly shown within the packet; however, the source 
and destination only refers to the start and end points of the tunnel and not the source and destination of the 
original IPv6 packet. The analysis also shows that protocol type 41 was used to send the IPv6 packet over the 




Figure 13. IPv4 header 
Upon analysis of the IPv6 header in figure 14, it is clear to see that the source and destination of the IPv6 
addresses are available. This is unlike the IPv4 header analysis where only the IPv6 source and destination are 
available.  
 
Figure 14. IPv6 header 
The experiment has clearly shown that not only is a sniffing attack possible within the 6to4 environment but 
is also possible to gain access to source and destination information of packets. This leaves the network 
vulnerable to spoofing attacks which allow the malicious user to modify easily IPv6 source and destination 
addresses which are encapsulated in the tunnel.  
5.3. Implementation of IPv6 Attacks 
The previous sections have provided much information on the security vulnerabilities which exist within each 
technology and the possible attacks which can be carried out. This section looks at the attacks and demonstrates 
the tools which can be used to carry out new attacks like host probing, fake router, flooding and spoofing 
attacks.  
5.3.1. Method 
In order to carry out this experiment, three Virtual Machines were set up and connected using Debian, 














Figure 17. Windows Server IPv6 address 
 
The Debian machine was used to simulate the attacker on the network. The following list of tools was installed 
on the machine: 
Table 1. Attack tools [26] 
Tool Name Description  
6to4test This little script tests if the IPv4 target has a dynamic 6to4 tunnel active 
inject_alive6 This tool answers to keep-alive requests on PPPoE and 6in4 tunnels; for 
PPPoE it also sends keep-alive requests. 
alive6 Shows alive addresses in the segment. If you specify a remote router, the 
packets are sent with a routing header prefixed by fragmentation 
covert_send6 Sends the content of FILE covertly to the target and its POC  
detect-new-ip6 Detects new ipv6 addresses joining the local network. 
detect_sniffer6 Tests if systems on the local LAN are sniffing. 
dnsrevenum6 Performs a fast reverse DNS enumeration and can cope with slow 
servers. 
dos-new-ip6 This tools prevents new ipv6 interfaces from coming up 
dump_router6 Dumps all local routers and their information 
fake_advertise6 Advertise ipv6 address on the network (with own mac if not specified), 
sending it to the all-nodes multicast address if no target address is set. 
Source IP address is the address advertised if not set. 
fake_dhcps6 Fake DHCPv6 server. Use to configure an address and set a DNS server 
fake_dns6d Fake DNS server that serves the same ipv6 address to any lookup request 
You can use this together with parasite6 if clients have a fixed DNS 
server 
fake_mld6 Advertise or delete yourself or anyone in a multicast group. 
fake_mldrouter6 Announce, delete or solicited MLD router - yourself or others. 
fake_router6 Announce yourself as a router and try to become the default router. If a 
non-existing link-local or mac address is supplied, this results in a DOS. 
flood_advertise6 Flood the local network with neighbour advertisements. 
flood_mld26 Flood the local network with MLDv2 reports. 
flood_mld6 Flood the local network with MLD reports. 
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flood_router6 Flood the local network with router advertisements. 
flood_router26 Flood the local network with router advertisements. 
fragmentation6 Performs fragment firewall and implementation checks, including the 
denial-of-service. 
implementation6 Performs some ipv6 implementation checks, can be used to test some 
firewall features too.  
kill_router6 Announce that a target a router going down to delete it from the routing 
tables. 
redir6 Implant a route into victim IP. 
rsmurf6 Smurfs the local network of the victim. 
  
The following tools were used to carry out this simulation: fake_router6, flood_router6, flood_router26, detect-
new-ip6 and dos-new-ip6.  We were not able to simulate attacks for all the tools due to the many attacks which 
exist. However, this shows the possibility of many attacks which can be carried out.  
5.3.2. Results 
The results of the simulation are discussed below. 
5.3.2.1. New Host Probing 
Using detect-new-ip6, the attacker’s computer will listen for ICMPv6 messages on the network and respond 
to the attacker by showing the IP address of the newly connected device. In this scenario, the Windows Server 
and Windows 7 was disconnected and reconnected to the network. Upon reconnection, the tool detected a new 
device being connected to the network, as shown in figure 18. The hacker uses such software to start the first 
step of hacking which is to get the victim’s IP address. 
 
Figure 18. IP addresses for devices being connected 
5.3.2.2. Malicious Router 
Using the tool fake_router6, the attacker can send router advertisement packets to the network with the 
highest priority and make all devices on the network believe that it is the legitimate router, as shown in the 
figures below. This will allow the fake router to set the machine as the default gateway which allows the 




Figure 19. IPv6 address for Windows Server before running fake router 
 
Figure 20. Starting fake_router6 
 
Figure 21. IPv6 address has been changed in both Windows machines 
If the attacker gives a non-existent link-local address then it will be a DoS attack. Figure 22 and 23 show 
what the software can do. 
 




Figure 23. Result in victim machine   
5.3.2.3. DoS Attack 
Using flood_router6, the attacker is able to flood all devices on the network. As shown in figure 24 and 
figure 25, many thousands of packets are sent from the attacker’s machine to the target hosts. Within 2 
seconds all hosts which were connecting to the network are unresponsive as shown in figure 26. 
 
Figure 24. The old version of the flooding tool  
 




Figure 26. Result after running flooding tool 
5.3.2.4. Spoofing Address 
This tool is very similar to detect-new-ip6. However, this tool will listen for ICMPv6 DAD messages on the 
network and respond with a message to say that the IPv6 address already exists. In this way, no host will be 
able to connect to the network, thereby leading to a DOS attack. The attack tools and the result can be seen in 
the figures below.  
 
Figure 27. Command to run the software in Debian  
 
Figure 28. The target machines show a message (IP address is used)  
5.3.3. Discussion 
As can be seen from the information presented above, the tools and technique to attack any IPv6 network have 
already been developed. The attacks which were carried out were with ease and easy for anyone to replicate. 
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The only action required by the attacker is to run the program. So the attacks are very simple to carry out, and 
one would be able to carry out other attacks with the tools that have been shown in Table 1. 
6. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
Within this section, the performance of the network which is shown below was carried out to understand the 
differences in the performance between native IPv4 and IPv6 networks with that of the dual-stack and 6to4 
tunnel and manual tunnel; therefore four different scenarios were created using Riverbed. The reason this 
performance analysis has been carried out is to show the effects of each type of network on the hardware. This 
is an important factor which must be considered because stressing the servers too much can lead to a slow 
connection; network efficiency must be considered. 
6.1. Method  
As can be seen in the network topology in the figure 29, a total of six routers has been utilised, connected via 
serial ports. Router R1 and R6 are connected to a pair of switches by fast Ethernet ports. On the R1 side, each 
switch then connects to a LAN which consists of a number of hosts independently. On S3 and S4, an email 
and database servers are found respectively. The same network topology has been used in all scenarios. 
 
Figure 29. Network Topology 
An application was chosen to be accessed (as shown at the top of the above figure). The following performance 
tests were then run to measure the stress on the various elements: 
CPU Utilisation of the router will report, in percentage, the utilisation of the CPU resources for the various 
activities in a given time frame. It will also take into account the background utilisation.  
Traffic dropped will be calculated by the number of IP datagrams that are dropped per second by the router. 
Processing delay, calculated in seconds, the delay which is experienced by an IP datagram within the given IP 
layer. In other words, this shows the delay from when the packet arrives to when it leaves the IP layer. This 
delay includes queuing delay (to get to the head of the queue to start processing) and processing delay (based 
on the processing speed/forwarding rate) 
6.2. Results and Discussion 
The results which have been shown below are taken from router R6. They are explained with graphs as 
follows. 
6.2.1. CPU Utilisation  
The results in figure 30 show that the inefficient scenarios were for the 6to4 and manual tunnels, which 
utilised more than 50% resources as compared with dual stack. The most efficient scenarios were native IPv4 





Figure 30. CPU utilization 
6.2.2. Traffic Dropped  
The results of this analysis in figure 31 show that dual-stack, IPv4 and IPv6 scenarios dropped a negligible 
number of packets. On the other hand, both the manual and 6to4 tunnel dropped a high number of packets 
initially. However, with the passing of time the 6to4 tunnel dropped more packets while the manual tunnel 
dropped fewer packets.  
 
Figure 31. Average traffic dropped 
6.2.3. IP Processing Delay 
The results of this analysis in figure 32 are varied; however, the general trend is that all scenarios began with 
an increase in processing delay, with both 6to4 and manual tunnels producing the highest delay. On the other 
hand, the dual-stack, IPv4 and IPv6 scenarios levelled out fairly quickly, providing an average delay of 
0.000020 while the 6to4 tunnel was giving a delay of 0.000021 on average. It can be seen that throughout the 
analysis, the 6to4 tunnel has the highest processing delay; this is because the end-point of the tunnel is not 




Figure 32. Average processing delay 
6.3. Discussion 
The simulation ran for 20 minutes. The performance analysis has shown both 6to4 and manual tunnel 
scenarios have been inefficient compared to others, providing the most CPU utilisation, the most number of 
packets dropped and the highest processing delay in all scenarios.  A comparison of all the results has been 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Scenario comparison 




IP Processing Delay 
(seconds) 
6to4 Tunnel 0.25 0.03 0.000021 
Dual Stack 0.11 0.00 0.000020 
IPv4 0.06 0.00 0.000020 
IPv6 0.06 0.00 0.000020 
Manual Tunnel 0.229 0.025 0.000021 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to investigate dual stack and tunnelling technologies while also looking at security 
risks of IPv6 and transition technologies. To investigate the two technologies, two mechanisms, dual stack and 
tunnelling, were broken down into their respective parts to get a deeper understanding. IPv6 transition relies 
on transition mechanisms to complete a successful migration. Therefore both dual stack and tunnelling 
mechanisms are essential elements which need further investigation. These two transition mechanisms allow 
for IPv4 and IPv6 devices to work in the same network in the various ways described above, however, leaves 
severe vulnerabilities. As with anything in networking, there are security implications which must be 
investigated. IPv6, dual-stack and tunnelling mechanisms have their risks. The two most common attacks 
which can be seen in IPv6 protocols, dual stack and tunnelling technologies are DoS and spoofing attacks; 
however, there are many other attacks which apply to each technology. Implementation of the dual stack and 
tunnel scenarios allowed us to understand the various complexities involved in each mechanism while also 
briefly investigating the security risks associated. With these security risks in mind, we carried out some simple 
attacks to simulate the ease with which one can attack the network. The performance analyses conducted 
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